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LABELING THEORY AND PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY: TOWARD
THE MEASUREMENT OF INDIVIDUAL VARIATION*
JOSEPH A. SCIMECCA**
Labeling theory which, in the early 1960s,
began to challenge the functionalist version of
anomie as the dominant paradigm in crimino-
logical theory,' has recently come in for a spate
of criticism. 2 Indeed, the criticisms came so
rapidly and were so abundant that by 1973 one
writer, Peter Manning, could speak of the
exhaustion of labeling as a theory.3 While the
basic criticisms of labeling theory range from
the problem of limited applicability to its over-
emphasis upon official as opposed to unofficial
reactions to deviance, 4 two major criticisms
stand out above the rest. These are that Label-
ing Theory has not been empirically validated5
and that proponents of Labeling Theory have
posited a deterministic view of the individual
actor in the face of official stigmatization.6 Both
* This is a revision of a paper presented to the
American Society of Criminology, Toronto, Canada,
November, 1975.
** Associate Professor and Chair, Department of
Sociology, George Mason University.
1 For an analysis of the paradigmatic changes in
modern criminological theory, see Scimecca & Lee,
Paradigm Changes in Criminology and the Sociology of
Deviance: A Sociology of Knowledge Approach, in THE
OLD AND THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY, (E. Flynn ed.,
publication forthcoming).
'See E. SAGARIN, DEVIANTS AND DEVIANCE (1975);
Akers, Problems in the Sociology of Deviance, 46 Soc.
FORCES 455 (1968); Gibbs, Conceptions ofDeviantBehav-
ior: The Old and the New, 9 PAC. Soc. REv. 9 (1966);
Manning, Survey Essay on Deviance, 2 CONTEMP. SOC.
123 (1973); Wellford, Labelling Theory and Criminology:
An Assessment, 22 Soc. PROB. 332 (1975). For responses
to criticisms of labeling theory, see H. BECKER,
Labeling Theory Reconsidered in THE OUTSIDERS (2d
ed. 1973); Goode, On Behalf of Labelling Theory, 22
Soc. PROB. 570 (1975).
3 Manning, supra note 2, at 123.
4 For an excellent summary of the criticisms leveled
against labeling theory see E. SAGARIN, supra note 2,
at 121.
5 In particular, see E. SAGARIN, supra note 2, at
121; Gove, The Labelling Theory of Mental Illness: A
Reply to Scheff, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 242 (1975); Scheff,
Reply to Chauncy and Gove, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 252
(1975); Scheff, The Labelling Theory of Mental Illness,
39 Am. Soc. REV. 444 (1974); Wellford, supra note 2.
6 See Scimecca, The Implications of the Sociology of
Knowledge of C. Wright Mills for Modern Criminological
of these criticisms, I will argue, can be traced
to the Labeling Theorist's failure to incorporate
a fully developed psychological conception of
the individual into their scheme of analysis.
While lip-service is paid to George Herbert
Mead's notion of the development of self
(which is so well-known to social scientists that
I will not dwell upon it here'), Labeling Theor-
ists in general still posit an amorphous concep-
tion of self which almost precludes viable em-
pirical research." Only by incorporating a fully
developed theory of psychological processes
into Labeling Theory can the theory's propo-
nents overcome the criticisms raised against it.
The psychological model of human behavior
offered here, which I contend can satisfy this
need, is Personal Construct Theory as devel-
oped by the late clinical psychologist, George
Kelly. Such a synthesis of Labeling Theory and
Personal Construct Theory will not only go a
long way towards answering the major criti-
cisms leveled against Labeling Theory but will
provide a multivariable theory of criminal be-
havior, one which can take both subjective and
objective factors into consideration.
The Empirical Validation of Labeling Theory
The basic proposition of Labeling Theory
assumes "that societal reaction in the form of label-
ing or official typing, and consequent stigmatization,
leads to an altered identity in the actor, necessitating
a reconstitution of self." However, since Labeling
Theorists have concentrated for the most part
Theory, 3 INT'L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 145
(1975); J. Quadagno & R. Antonio, An Extended
Model of Labelling Theory: The Case of Mental
Illness (paper presented to the Society for the Study
of Social Problems, Montreal, Canada, 1974).
7 For a statement of Mead's social-psychology, see
G. MEAD, MIND, SELF AND SOCIETY (1934).
8 For a limited exception, see Rotenberg, Self-La-
belling Theory: Preliminary Findings among Mental Pa-
tients, 15 BRIT.J. CRIMINOLOGY 360 (1975).
9 Davis, Labelling Theory in Deviance Research: A
Critique and Reconsideration, 13 Soc. Q. 447, 460 (1972)
(emphasis in original).
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on labelers and those already labeled, there is
virtually no substantiation of the assumption
that a reconstitution of self occurs when one
becomes, to use Lemert's term, a "secondary
deviant." Indeed, Lemert himself takes the
notion of altered status as given in his definition
of what constitutes secondary deviation.
Secondary deviation refers to a special class of
socially defined responses which people make
to problems created by the societal reaction to
their deviance. These problems are essentially
normal problems which revolve around stigma-
tization, punishments, segregation, and social
control. Their general effect is to differentiate
the symbolic and interactional environment to
which the person responds, so that early or
adult socialization is categorically affected. They
become central facts of existence for those ex-
periencing them, altering psychic structure,
producing specialized organization of social
roles and self-regarding attitudes. Actions which
have these roles and self-attitudes as their refer-
ents make up secondary deviance. The second-
ary deviant, as opposed to his actions, is a
person whose life and identity are organized
around the facts of deviance.10
Concepts, such as "self," "self-attitude," "self-
concept" are never fully defined, and at-
tempted definitions are usually tautological.
For instance, one definition which just about
all Labeling Theorists would subscribe to is:
"self-concept is a term used to refer to a
person's organization of his self-attitudes.* n
But how does one organize one's self-attitudes,
indeed what are self-attitudes? What we are
left with is a dilemma subsequently reflected in
the research. For as GaryJensen points out:
[S]elf-concept variables are sometimes treated
as independent and sometimes as dependent
variables, with some theorists and researchers
focusing on the consequences of deviance for
one's self-image, others focusing on the conse-
quences of one's self-image for deviance, and
others focusing on both.
12
The implications are apparent. The defini-
tions of self and self-attitude are so unclear as
10 E. LEMERT, HUMAN DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROB-
LEMS, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 40-41 (1967).
11 Videbeck, Self-Conception and the Reaction of Oth-
ers, 23 SOCIOMETRY 351 (1960).
12 Jensen, Delinquency and Adolescent Self-Conception:
A Study of the Personal Relevance of Infraction, 50 Soc.
FORCES 84n (1972).
to almost preclude viable empirical research. A
prime example of how this vagueness of terms
affects research can be seen in the works of
Walter Reckless and his associates. 3
Briefly stated, Reckless et al. examined the
"self-concepts" of teenage boys to see whether
variations in their conceptions of themselves
accounted for specific patterns of behavior, in
this case, delinquency. The initial study by
Reckless, Dinitz and Murray, investigated 125
"good" boys as defined by their teachers and
substantiated by official records and self-evalu-
ative item questionnaires, and found that the
"good" boys had "good" self-conceptions.14
Subsequent follow-up studies of "good" and
"bad" boys showed that self-conceptions were
generally predictive of deviant behavior. Spe-
cifically, a much greater proportion of boys
with "poor" concepts had juvenile court rec-
ords, than did boys with "good" self-concep-
tions.1 s While the methodological problems
with the Reckless studies are apparent-in par-
ticular the failure to use parallel groups as a
control-in terms of our concerns, the major
weakness is the insufficient definition of "self."
Schwartz and Stryker, summarizing this prob-
lem in Reckless's work, write:
A critical analysis of the work of Reckless and
his associates ... leads to the conclusion that,
while their belief that self and deviance are
related in particular ways may be sound, their
methods in seeking to validate it are weak in-
deed. In particular (and this is hardly peculiar
to them), they offer no ground rules for differ-
entiating between the subject's self-relevant re-
sponses to instruments designed to elicit infor-
mation from them and their responses which
are not self-relevant. Nor do they supply ground
rules for differentiating the particular aspects
of self that "make a difference" with respect to
deviance in general or delinquency in particular.
13 See Dinitz, Scarpitti, & Reckless, Delinquency Vul-
nerability: A Cross Group and Longitudinal Analysis, 27
AM. Soc. REv. 515 (1962); Reckless & Dinitz, Pioneer-
ing with Self-Concept as a Vulnerability Factor in Delin-
quency, 58J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 515 (1967); Reckless,
Dinitz & Kay, The Self-Component in Potential Delin-
quency and Potential Non-Delinquency, 22 AM. Soc.
REv. 566 (1957); Reckless, Dinitz & Murray, Self-
Concept as an Insulator Against Delinquency, 21 AM.
Soc. R~v. 744 (1956); Scarpitti, Murray, Dinitz &
Reckless, The "Good" Boy in a High Delinquency Area:
Four Years Later, 25 AM. Soc. REv. 555 (1960).
14 See Reckless, Dinitz & Murray, supra note 13.
1 See Scarpitti, Murray, Dinitz & Reckless, supra
note 13; Dinitz, Scarpitti & Reckless,supra note 13.
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In brief, given the absence of ground rules,
anything an actor says or does is "self," and the
chances of reaching very precise conclusions by
means of a construct of such spacious dimen-
sions are virtually nil. 16
Schwartz and Stryker, themselves, then try
to overcome these weaknesses in Reckless's no-
tion of self-concept and posit the following as
basic premises for a definition of self:
I. Persons seek to create and maintain stable,
coherent identities.
2. They prefer identities with positive affect; in
other words, people prefer to think well of
themselves.
3. Identities are motivational forces; they are
imperatives to behavior which enact or sym-
bolize them.
4. Identities develop in the process of social
interaction. Shared expectations of behavior,
they emerge from the relationship of person
and others with whom he is embedded in
networks of social interaction.
5. Concretely, behavior is a function of a role-
making process. All behavior, including that
which is deviant, involves the interplay of
definitions of self and reactions of others;
or, to state it in another way, the interplay of
claims of identity and the verification or
denial.
6. Identities are fixed or stabilized by commit-
ments. The actor's investment in his network
of social relationships reinforces the signifi-
cance to him of the identity on which his
network is based.1
7
They then use Osgood's and associates'18
measure of the Semantic Differential, claiming
as a theoretical justification an affinity between
Osgood's analysis of the development of mean-
ing and Mead's analysis of the development of
the self.' 9
In brief, the Semantic Differential is an in-
strument which uses a seven-point, bipolar rat-
ing scale. The major difference between the
Semantic Differential and other rating devices
is that its rating scales are based on an extensive
series of factor analytic studies. The Semantic
Differential thus offers an opportunity for
cross comparisons of the meanings of two dif-
ferent words for one subject, or the meanings
of the same words for a number of subjects, by
16 M. SCHWARTZ & S. STRYKER, DEVIANCE,
SELVES AND OTHERS 18 (1970).
17 Id. at 15.
18 C. OSGOOD, G. Suci & P. TANNENBAUM, THE
MEASUREMENT OF MEANING (1957).
'9 M. SCHWARTZ & S. STRYKER, sUpra note 16, at 3.
enabling the investigator to sum ratings in
terms of three major dimensions: evaluative,
potency and activity. There is a major statistical
problem with the Semantic Differential in that
whether two particular scales correlate posi-
tively or negatively is to a large degree a func-
tion of the particular concepts rated on the
scales. Serious questions can be raised, there-
fore, as to whether the findings of orthogonal-
ity between major factors, which Osgood used
as the basis of his instrument are invalid, since
they are based on a matrix of inter-correlations
which in themselves, most likely, do not mean-
ingfully reflect the true state of affairs, but are
instead a pooling of errors. 20 Thus, when
Schwartz and Stryker write that, "we do not
believe that the gap between our theory and
our findings is to be accounted for by the
methods we used,"2' to justify their inconclusive
findings concerning self-conceptions of blacks
and delinquency, I would seriously question
this interpretation.
There is certainly a gap between their theory
and their method because their method does
not allow for the fact that individuals are con-
stantly reconstructing their meaning struc-
ture-that this meaning structure cannot be
adequately measured by a pre-determined
framework. As presently constituted the Se-
mantic Differential simply cannot examine the
manner in which an individual organizes and
creates his/her way of viewing the world and
self. Implicit in its use is a view of the indiviu-
dal, not as Mead envisioned him/her-as one
who actively engages in a creative dialogue
with social reality- but simply as one who reacts
to social stimuli. In short, Schwartz and Stryker
base their study on a view of the individual as a
passive agent, a view they share with the over-
whelming majority of Labeling Theorists.
Perhaps the most important empirical test of
labeling has been attempted by Mordechai Ro-
tenberg 2 As Rotenberg points out, "Any the-
ory of social labeling which does not provide
the conceptual framework for analyzing the
properties of self-labeling accompanying the
social process is incomplete." ' Seeking to em-
pirically answer the question of what, from the
20 D. BANNISTER & J. MAIR, THE EVALUATION OF
PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS 127 (1968).
21 M. SCHWARTZ & S. STRYKER, supra note 16, at
124.
22 Rotenberg, supra note 8.
23 Rotenberg, Self-Labeling: A Missing Link In the
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actor's perspective, makes a label stick,2 Roten-
berg offers a conceptual scheme which argues
that self-labeling among mental patients varies
according to the incorporation of specific be-
liefs and cultural roots that underlie major
Western and Eastern labeling systems. 25 Using
a sample of forty adult Israeli mental patients
diagnosed as schizophrenic, Rotenberg found
that those who were of Western origin per-
ceived their label as an a priori categorical
ascription, one that was innate and irreversible,
what he called "indicative labeling."' New pa-
tients of Eastern origin, on the other hand,
were more likely to see their label as externally
induced, and which could be curable, or
changed ("transmutive labeling").27 As time of
hospitalization increased, however, the Eastern
patients came to accept "indicative labeling.
2
Although Rotenberg's work can be used to
support a deterministic and passive view of
labelees, such an interpretation is a risky one
at best, given that the role theory Rotenberg
uses leaves out too many unexplained variables
which might account for the initial differences
in "indicative" and "transmutive" labeling ac-
ceptance. More importantly, though, is the fact
that Rotenberg, like Schwartz and Stryker, of-
fers a pre-determined framework for analyzing
self-labeling. It is no wonder then that his
conclusions point, in the end, to an overdeter-
mined conception of the individual.
Labeling Theory's Deterministic View of the Individ-
ual Actor in the Face of Official Stigmatization
As stated previously, a number of recent
writers have pointed to the implicit determi-
nism of Labeling Theory. In brief, the argu-
ment states that Labeling Theory has done a
disservice to the work of George Herbert Mead,
by conveying a unilateral process which omits
human choice.2 9 This determinism is a direct
result of Labeling Theory's overemphasis on
successful labeling, its stress on the perfor-
mance of deviant roles, and its primary focus
upon the social audience. 30 What seems to have
"Societal Reaction" Theory of Deviance, 22 Soc. REV.
335, 339 (1974).
24 Rotenberg, supra note 8, at 360.
2Id. at 360-67.
26/d.
27 Id. at 365-66.
2,8Id. at 373.
29 Quadagno & Antonio, supra note 6.
30Id.
occurred is that Mead's conflict between inde-
terminancy and determinancy has been re-
solved, in practice, by an acceptance, among
Labeling Theorists, of determination. As Paul
Schervish so aptly phrased it, "Unfortunately
for the long-range development of the labeling
perspective, the situation that imposed the few-
est methodological problems for research were,
not surprisingly, the ones in which individuals
became formed rather passively into secondary
deviants."'31 The split over methodology that
characterized the two major strands of Sym-
bolic Interactionism, Herbert Blumer and the
Chicago School as opposed to Manfred Kuhn
and the Iowa School, has manifested itself in
the notion of self adhered to by Labeling
Theorists. Bernard Meltzer and John Petras
have summed up quite well these differences:
Blumer and Kuhn ascribe different qualities to
the self. Blumer contends that the self is a
process of internal conversation, in the course
of which the actor can come to view himself in a
new way, thereby bringing about changes in
himself... As Blumer writes, "The vital de-
pendancy of the attitude on the nature of the
ongoing interaction suggests how fallacious it is
to use the attitude to construct the scheme of
that interaction." Kuhn, on the other hand,
describes the self and human interaction as
structures. The organized set of self-attitudes
serves as a system of pre-established plans of
action. And human association takes the form
of fairly stable, ready-made patterns of role and




For Labeling Theory, the players are differ-
ent but the game is the same. Labeling Theor-
ists, for the most part, have chosen the Kuhn-
ian branch of Symbolic Interactionism and
thereby opt for a deterministic view of man.
This, in part, explains the almost exclusive
concentration upon the regulation of the de-
viant by some group. In Kuhn's perspective, if
we know the individual's reference groups, we
"1 Schervish, The Labeling Perspective: Its Bias and
Potential in the Study of Political Deviance, 8 Am. Soci-
OLOGiST 47, 48 (1973).
32 Meltzer & Petras, The Chicago and Iowa Schools of
Symbolic Interactionism, in SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM:
A READER IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 43, 53 (J. Manis &
B. Meltzer eds. 1972) (quoting Blumer, Pyschological
Import of the Human Group in GROuP-RELATIONS AT
THE CROSSROADS (M. Sherif & M. Wilson eds. 1953)).
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can predict his self-attitudes and hence his
behavior. What is missing, though, from such
a perspective, is the reflexive nature of the
self. Given the theoretical justification for La-
beling Theory (Meadian social-psychology),
there is no reason for assuming that the deviant
label is accepted. The premise that an individ-
ual may simply reject or fight back against the
labeling process is as likely an outcome as one
which posits complete acceptance. Two recent
studies, one based on empirical data, the other
more of an analytical scheme, call attention to
the process of rejection of deviant labels and
are therefore worth mentioning here. The
first, by Quadagno and Antonio,n shows how
mental patients use certain techniques in order
to resist labeling and maintain a normal iden-
tity, when faced with official stigmatization. As
the authors put it, "The labeling process is
neither automatic nor self-fulfilling-even for
those who have undergone official labeling and
institutionalization. '34 The second work, by
Rogers and Buffalo, 5 offers nine possible ways,
ranging from repudiation to alteration, which
individuals use to fight back against being la-
beled a deviant.
In short, Mead's theory of the development
of self points to a reflexive interpretation of
the individual action. However, because his
overall scheme is undeveloped, Labeling
Theorists have taken the easy way out (both
methodologically and politically)36 and offered
an "over-determined conception of man."
What is needed, if Labeling Theory is to answer
its critics, is a view of self that gives primary
emphasis to the active, exploratory side of the
individual without at the same time sacrificing
the methodological rigor necessary for an ex-
planatory theory of deviant behavior. In short,
the answer to Labeling Theory's weaknesses
lies in a theory of self that goes beyond Mead -
a fully developed, empirically sound view of
the individual seen as one who is actively en-
gaged in the act of trying to control his/her
own destiny. Such a theory, I will argue in the
next section of this paper, already exists. This
33 Quadagno & Antonio, supra note 6.
3 4
1d.
I Rogers & Buffalo, Fighting Back: Nine Models of
Adaptation to a Deviant Label, 22 Soc. PROB. 101 (1974).
36 See Schervish, supra note 31, for an analysis of
the political implications of determinism in labeling
theory.
theory, Personal Construct Theory, can pro-
vide the necessary means of investigating the
subjective side of deviant behavior, something
that has been conspicuous by its absence in
Labeling Theory.
As was shown in this section, Labeling The-
ory lacks an adequate psychological base, a
viable, researchable notion of self that does not
sacrifice the active, volitional side of the indi-
vidual. In the following sections, I will argue
that Personal Construct Theory as developed
by George Kelly can provide just such a base.
This is so, because according to Personal Con-
struct Theory, individuals come to know some-
thing about the world in which they live only
insofar as they can make interpretations of it.
Man can only come to know the world by means
of the constructions he places upon it and he
will be bound by events to the extent that his
ingenuity limits his possibilities for reconstruct-
ing these events. Each man erects for himself a
representational model of the world which al-
lows him to make sense out of it and which




The Formal Content of Personal Construct Theory-n
George Kelly proposed, as the "Fundamental
Postulate" of his theory, that a person's processes
are psychologically channelized by the ways in which
he anticipates events. Eleven corollaries are elab-
orated from this fundamental postulate. They
start from the assumption that individuals an-
ticipate events by construing their replications
and evolve for themselves a construction system,
which allows them to test these anticipations.
Human beings can only come to know the
world by means of the constructions they place
upon it and are bound by events to the extent
that their ingenuity limits their possibilities for
reconstructing these events. In short, all indi-
viduals erect for themselves a representational
model of the world which allows them to make
sense out of it and further enables them to
chart a course of behavior in relation to the
representational model or construct system.
A construct is essentially two-ended, involv-
ing a particular basis for considering likeness
and difference and at the same time for exclud-
37 D. BANNISTER &J. MAIR, SUpra note 20, at 6.
38 For a full statement of Personal Construct The-
ory, see G. KELLY, THE PYSCHOLOGY OF PERSONAL
CONSTRUCTS: A THEORY OF PERSONALITY (1955).
[Vol. 68
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ing certain things as irrelevant to the construct
involved.39
Kelly emphasized that people choose for
themselves that alternative in a dichotomized
construct through which they anticipate the
greater possibility for the elaboration of their
system, and that a construct is convenient for
the anticipation of a finite range of events
only.
40
Construct Theory and Labeling Theory: A Synthesis
By combining Kelly's Personal Construct
Theory with Labeling Theory, the major criti-
cisms raised in the preceding section against
the latter can be answered.
Generally speaking, efforts to test and vali-
date the notion of "secondary deviance" have
largely resulted in negative findings. Follow-
up studies made of juveniles who were proc-
essed by official agencies, when compared to
others who were released to their homes, indi-
cate that processing does not result in any
greater amounts of recidivism, serious delin-
quency or adult criminality among those who
had been officially labeled than among those
who were not.4 1 These studies have not, how-
ever, actually tested the psychological state of
the labeled individual. That behavior follows
self-conception is simply assumed. If the indi-
vidual does not think of himself as a labeled
deviant, he will not engage in deviant action.
This may or may not be true, but what is
apparent is that Labeling Theorists, by eschew-
ing psychological variables, have not tested the
subjective state of the individual. Personal Con-
struct Theory enables the researcher to do just
this. George Kelly developed various methods
for eliciting and measuring the self-conceptions
of individuals -what he called their personal
construct systems. The most elaborate measure
is the grid form of his Role Construct Reper-
tory Test.42 Personal Construct Theory places
considerable stress on the notion that each
person erects for him or herself a hierarchically
organized system of interrelated constructs.
The repertory grid test investigates both con-
39 D. BANNISTER &J. MAIR,supra note 20.
40 G. KELLY, supra note 38, at 104-05.
41 E. SAGARIN, supra note 2, at 134.
42 Examples of specific role titles would be self,
mother, father, brother, sister, spouse, ex-flame,
best friend, ex-friend, rejecting person, pitied per-
son, threatening person, attractive person, accepted
struct relationships and hierarchical status.
Constructs are elicited from the subject by
asking him/her to supply names to fit various
role titles. Role titles, for example, range from
self to mother to successful person. The subject
is then asked to suggest some important ways
in which two of the people mentioned are alike
and different from a third. Through the use
of the grid method, the manner in which a
person organizes his/her own behavior is elic-
ited. When a person uses himself or herself as
a datum in forming new constructs, these con-
structs act as tight controls on his/her behav-
ior.43 For example, a person who includes him-
self in the context of the construct, powerful-
weak, binds himself to assess his/her own behav-
ior in relation to that dimension. 44 The person
has ordered his/her world along these con-
structs and sees him/herself in terms of them.
It requires only a slight alteration of Kelly's
methods to elicit constructs which take the key
dimensions of Labeling Theory into account.
In particular, those constructs pertaining to
authority and stigmatized roles would readily
lend themselves to analysis. While I am ob-
viously only pointing out the direction that an
altered Repertory Grid Test might take, nev-
ertheless the implications are quite clear. The
whole problem of why some individuals accept
and others reject negative labels becomes ex-
plainable. In the course of interpreting the
world, the individual as an active agent tests
out his/her interpretations. The methodology
of Personal Construct Theory enables the in-
vestigator to analyze the direction this testing
takes. Of particular importance, given the hi-
erarchical and bi-polar nature of individual
constructs, are superordinate constructs (those
that include others in its context); permeable
constructs (those to which new elements can be
teacher, rejected teacher, boss, successful person,
happy person, ethical person, neighbor. These would
be correlated on a grid with such constructs as kind -
cruel, frightening - gentle, carefree - conscientious,
understands me -unsympathetic, confident - anxious
and simple - intellectual. In a completed matrix low
scores represent negative associations and high
scores, positive ones. G. KELLY, supra note 38, at
266-77. For a description of studies which have
validated the Role Construct Repertory Grid, see D.
BANNISTER & J. MAIR, supra note 20.43 Id. at 27.
44 Id.
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added as a means of organizing future events);
core constructs (which govern the individual's
maintenance process); and tight constructs
(which lead to unvarying predictions). These
four constructs along with their bi-polar oppo-
sites, subordinate, impermeable, peripheral and
loose constructs can be analyzed to indicate the
acceptance or rejection of specific ideological
constraints by a given individual. At the ex-
pense of sounding simplistic, a Repertory Grid
given to a "secondary deviant" would elicit
acceptance of authority and stigmatization as
superordinate and core constructs, and in terms
of future behavioral patterns, permeable and
tight as his/her base for anticipating future
events. Potential rejection of deviant labels, on
the other hand, would manifest a high level of
potential for change on superordinate constructs.
Personal Construct Theory can thus get at
changes in how an individual views him/herself,
thereby providing a processual measure of per-
sonality-something that Labeling Theory cur-
rently lacks. This process works in the following
manner: whenever an individual is confronted
with the opportunity for making a choice, he/
she will tend to choose those alternatives which
seem to provide the best basis for anticipating
the ensuing events. 4 This view is thereby com-
patible with the more radical criticisms of La-
beling Theory which see the acceptance of the
label of deviant as being related to a condition
of powerlessness. 46 Powerless individuals, lower
class individuals, would of necessity see less
opportunity for resisting a negative label, and
hence would be more likely to construe alter-
natives which take this notion of reality into
account. Viewing deviance in this manner al-
lows the positing of choice to the actor, but at
the same time realistically notes that those in
positions of power have more choice than the
powerless. Such a view also rules out any value-
judgment on the part of the theorist. No objec-
tive moral judgment is made that the deviant is
"bad." It is the actor's subjective judgment that
is elicited. Acceptance of a deviant label may
simply be a matter of construing it as the best
alternative among other more limited ones. In
the end, it is the individual's construction of
self, that is focused upon. Further, "the fact
" G. KELLY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONALITY
CONSTRUCTS 64 (1963).
46 Goode, supra note 2, at 578.
that participants do not share the distinction
sociologists make" 47 is not a problem; it is taken
for granted.
What we have, then, is a way of analyzing
how the individual looks at himself/herself-a
way that entails freedom of choice. For as Kelly
states:
There are always some alternative's construc-
tions available to choose among in dealing with
the world. No one needs to paint himself into a
corner; no one needs to be completely hemmed
in by circumstances; no one needs to be the
victim of his biography. We call this philosophi-
cal position constructive alternativism .4
Individuals seek to understand this world
through an infinite series of approximations -
anticipation of events. The Repertory Grid
Test elicits how the individual anticipates the
course of events which make up his/her world,
be he/she labeled a deviant or a conformist.
The Repertory Grid differs in this manner
substantially from the Semantic Differential,
which I criticized earler, because the Semantic
Differential defines the conceptual structure of
the subject in terms of three prescribed nom-
othetic dimensions derived from pooled data,
while the Grid does not impose preconceived
categories upon the individual, allowing the
individual to generate a unique psychological
portrait of himself/herself.
Implications also arise for treatment and
rehabilitation (another criticism raised against
Labeling Theory) ,49 in that those who manifest
permeable constructs in relation to stigmatiza-
tion would be better risks for rehabilitation. In
short, Personal Construct Theory, by positing
a viable psychological model-one that shows
how individuals interpret, inquire about, and
actively construct their world-while at the
same time offering a methodology capable of
assessing this construction, provides an insight
into the "reciprocal relationship between actor
and reactor, stimulus and response, and most
importantly, between preexisting differences
and 'reaction effects.' "5" Personal Construct
Theory, by providing the psychological model
47 Id. at 574.48 G. KELLY, Supra note 45, at 15.
49 E. SAGARIN,Supra note 2, at 139.
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for Labeling Theory, provides an answer to
Tangri and Schwartz's call for "designs in delin-
quency which are analyses of variance de-
signs."51 A Labeling Theory which can measure
51 Tangri & Schwartz, Delinquency Research and the
Self-Concept Variable, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 182
(1967).
individual variation is now possible. If Labeling
Theorists can overcome their reticence in using
psychological variables, a viable theory of crim-
inal behavior is theirs for the taking. If not,
given the spiral of criticism leveled against it,
Labeling Theory will most likely go the way of
anomie theory, a fate it does not deserve.
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